evasion: Expected utility versus prospect theory. by Sanjit Dhami & Sanjit Dhami
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
   
 
 
 
OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION IN THE 
PRESENCE OF TAX EVASION: EXPECTED 
UTILITY VERSUS PROSPECT THEORY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sanjit Dhami, University of Leicester, UK 
Ali al-Nowaihi, University of Leicester, UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 07/10 
September 2007 
 
 Optimal income taxation in the presence of tax
evasion: Expected utility versus prospect theory.
Sanjit Dhami￿ Ali al-Nowaihiy
27 September 2007
Abstract
The predictions of expected utility theory (EUT) applied to tax evasion are
￿ awed on two counts: (i) They are quantitatively in error by huge orders of mag-
nitude. (ii) Higher taxation is predicted to lower evasion, which is at variance with
the evidence. An emerging literature in behavioral economics, most notably based
on prospect theory (PT), has shown that behavioral economics is much better at
explaining tax evasion. We extend this literature to incorporate issues of optimal
taxation. As a benchmark for a successful theory, we require that it should explain,
jointly, the facts on the tax rate, tax gap and the level of government expenditure.
We ￿nd that when taxpayers use EUT (respectively, PT) and the optimal tax is de-
rived from a social welfare function that also uses EUT (respectively, PT), then, the
calibration results are completely at odds with the facts. However, when taxpayers
use PT but the social welfare function uses standard EUT, there is a very close match
between the predictions and the facts. This has important implications for context
dependent preferences but also for the newly emerging literature on liberalism versus
paternalism in behavioral economics.
Keywords: Prospect theory, Expected utility theory, Tax evasion, Optimal taxa-
tion, Normative versus positive economics, Context dependent preferences, Liberal-
ism, Paternalism.
JEL Classi￿cation: D81 (Criteria for Decision Making Under Risk and Uncer-
tainty), H26 (Tax Evasion), K42 (Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law).
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yDepartment of Economics, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester. LE1 7RH, UK. Phone:
+44-116-2522898. Fax: +44-116-2522908. E-mail: aa10@le.ac.uk.￿Even when an agent is perfectly rational in the sense that he systematically maximizes
some function, it is not at all obvious that the utility function which explains his behavior
should be inserted into the welfare considerations ... More generally, once psychological
e⁄ects enter into the calculus, there is no escape from separating welfare and behavior.￿
Rubinstein (2005).
￿paternalism [is the] power and authority one person or institution exercises over an-
other to confer bene￿ts or prevent harm for the latter regardless of the latter￿ s informed
consent ... paternalism ... increases the potential for the abuse of state power, arbitrary
discrimination, tyranny, and civil strife ... liberalism ... provides the only way for the pro-
ponents of con￿icting ways of life to live together ... liberalism [is] the only viable basis for
peaceful coexistence in culturally and religiously plural societies.￿The Oxford Companion
to Philosophy (2005, pp 515, 648).
1. Introduction
Issues of tax evasion are extremely important for all countries. Losses to society from tax
evasion are huge. For the USA, for example, based on the most recent data, the tax gap1 is
of the order of $300 billion per year (Slemrod, 2007).2 An important feature of the existing
analysis of tax evasion is that it has largely been carried out in an expected utility theory
(EUT) framework.
Recent research points to several serious problems in using an EUT approach to tax
evasion. Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) apply Kahneman and Tversky￿ s (1979) prospect
theory3 (PT) to the tax evasion decision facing a taxpayer. They show that while EUT
gives the correct qualitative results for the e⁄ects of the probability of detection and the
penalty rate, there are several problems. First, EUT makes the prediction that under
reasonable attitudes to risk, namely, non-increasing absolute risk aversion, the taxpayer
evades less as the tax rate goes up. The implication is that tax evasion will be at a minimum
when the tax rate is 100 percent. This result, due to Yitzhaki (1974), is contradicted by the
bulk of empirical evidence. Second, at existing penalty rates and detection probabilities,
the quantitative predictions of EUT on the extent of tax evasion are wrong by a factor of
about 100. On the other hand, PT gives the correct quantitative and qualitative results.4
1The tax gap is the di⁄erence between the amount owed in taxes and the amount actually collected by
the tax authorities. Income tax accounts for about two thirds of this gap; see Slemrod (2007).
2To this has to be added the cost of enforcement, the cost of misallocation of resources due to workers
and ￿rms diverting their e⁄orts to less productive but easier to evade activities and the cost due to
distorted prices, in particular between privately and publicly provided goods and services.
3The standard references for prospect theory are Kahneman and Tversky (1979) (which, incidentally,
is the most cited Econometrica paper) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Subsection 4 below gives a
self-contained exposition of prospect theory.
4But these are not the only problems that PT can rectify in the context of tax evasion. Empirical and
1Given the magnitudes involved, the misleading welfare consequences of applying EUT to
an analysis of tax evasion are potentially very large.
Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007), however, treat the tax rate as exogenous. In this paper,
we extend the analysis of Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) by asking what should the optimal
income tax be, when taxpayers use PT to make their tax evasion decision? This is a sub-
stantially more di¢ cult question because the appropriate welfare criteria under behavioral
economics is, as yet, an unsettled area.
1.1. A brief description of the model
Our framework of analysis is as follows. We consider a model where the government
levies taxes to ￿nance public provision of goods and services. Individuals can choose to
evade a fraction of their income. The government audits a fraction of the tax returns.
If a taxpayer is caught evading, he pays back owed tax plus a penalty. Individuals gain
utility from both private and public consumption. The government chooses the optimal
tax rate, given society￿ s preference between private and public expenditure, and taking
the subsequent tax evasion behavior of taxpayers into account. In this simple framework,
we assess the relative success of EUT and PT. We ￿nd that PT far outperforms EUT, and
also highlights the importance of recognizing that preferences are context dependent.
1.2. Brief literature review
The literature on endogenous evasion and optimal taxation is fairly limited and, without
exception, uses EUT. There are three main strands of the literature. In the ￿rst strand,
associated with Cremer and Gahvari (1993) and Boadway, Marchand and Pestieau (1994),
the problem is to ￿nd the optimal taxes set by a benevolent planner in the presence of tax
avoidance, rather than tax evasion. So, by incurring a cost, the taxpayer can ensure that
evasion is never discovered by the tax authorities. This in itself is an interesting problem
and allows one to make a case for commodity taxation. Because labour income can be
avoided while commodity income cannot be, hence, it is e¢ cient to have some commodity
taxes5. However, this leaves open the relation between tax evasion and optimal taxation.
The second strand is exempli￿ed in the work of Cremer and Gahvari (1996), Marhuenda
and Ortuno-Ortin (1997) and Chandar and Wilde (1998). Here the approach is to choose,
simultaneously, the optimal tax and the enforcement structure in order to induce truthful
experimental evidence show that obligatory advance tax payments reduce tax evasion, a fact that can be
explained by PT but not by EUT; see El⁄ers and Hessing (1997) and Yaniv (1999).
5In the absence of tax evasion it is known, from the results of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972, 1976), that
commodity taxes are redundant if income taxes are available. However, if tax bases are measured with
error, then a case can be made for commodity taxes even in the absence of tax evasion; see Dhami and
al-Nowaihi (2006).
2reporting of income. In equilibrium, there is no tax evasion. However, if eliminating
evasion completely is not possible, then the question of designing an optimal tax structure
remains unanswered.
The third strand is given by the recent work of Richter and Boadway (2006) to which
our work is most closely connected. They explicitly model the tax evasion decision in the
standard Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model. They consider a representative household,
hence, the focus is entirely on e¢ ciency issues. The central question, as in the ￿rst strand,
is the optimal mix of income and consumption taxes when the ease of evading di⁄erent
types of taxes is di⁄erent. The welfare objective of the government is to maximize its total
revenues (arising from income taxes, consumption taxes and penalties on those caught
evading) subject to a taxpayer participation constraint. The main disadvantage of the
income tax is that, by inviting tax evasion, it exposes the risk-averse taxpayer to income
risk.6 While the consumption tax cannot be evaded, its main disadvantage is that it
distorts relative prices of goods. Hence, optimal taxation arises from a tradeo⁄ between
imposing income risk on the taxpayer and creating tax distortions.
In the context of our paper, the main criticisms of the existing literature are as follows.
First, the behavioral approach to tax evasion shows that an EUT based analysis of tax
evasion is seriously misleading. However, the existing literature is based entirely on the
EUT framework. Second, tax evasion is a very real phenomenon in both developing and
developed countries. The mechanism design approach to evasion, which essentially searches
for optimal tax/penalty schemes to completely eliminate evasion, does not seem suitable.
Third, the cost of risk to the taxpayer from the risky activity of tax evasion needs to
be explicitly modelled. Fourth, one needs to explore welfare criteria other than revenue
maximization in designing optimal tax schemes.
1.3. Welfare analysis under behavioral economics
Under uncertainty, when decision makers have expected utility preferences, the Pareto
frontier can be found, subject to the standard regularity conditions, by a benevolent util-
itarian planner who maximizes a weighted sum of the individuals￿expected utilities.
Suppose now that individuals have prospect theory preferences (which we discuss in
detail in section 4). Under these preferences, decision makers (1) overweight small proba-
bilities, (2) evaluate gains and losses relative to a reference point, (3) are loss-averse and
(4) have distinct risk preferences depending on whether they are in the domain of gains or
losses, relative to the reference point.7
6This exposure to risk is completely ignored by the ￿rst strand of the literature, which assumes a
constant cost of such risky activity.
7Behavioral economics di⁄erentiates between several types of utility, in particular between decision
utility and experienced utility. PT, being a decision theory like EUT, considers decision utility; see, for
3Should a social planner respect the PT preferences of an individual? Or should the
planner disregard these preferences and evaluate the well being of society on the basis
of expected utility? These questions take us into relatively un-chartered territory in eco-
nomics. There is no clear consensus on the approach to be taken, but we illustrate some
well known views on this matter, below.
Tversky and Kahneman (1986, abstract) state that ￿no theory of choice can be both
normatively adequate and descriptively correct￿ . Their argument is as follows. Since in-
variance and dominance are always obeyed when their application is transparent, they
should be essential features of any normative theory. However, because of bounded ra-
tionality, they are often violated when application is not transparent. A descriptively
adequate theory must take account of this.
The modern literature on merit goods has stressed the bounded rationality of decision
makers. Should policy makers respect boundedly rational decisions or try to alter them?
This is the theme of recent work by Camerer et. al. (2003). These authors advocate the
case for asymmetric paternalism. Essentially this is an attempt to steer boundedly ratio-
nal people in the direction of avoiding costly mistakes but, at the same time, distorting
the decisions of rational people as little as possible. In the words of the authors: ￿And
a variety of researchers have shown that people exhibit systematic mis-predictions about
the costs and bene￿ts of choices￿ for example, the degree of loss aversion exhibited in
people￿ s choices seems inconsistent with their actual experiences of gains and losses. It is
such errors￿ apparent violations of rationality￿ that can justify the need for paternalistic
policies to help people make better decisions and come closer to behaving in their own
best interest.￿ 8
Several other forms of paternalism are advocated in the literature. Benjamin and
Laibson (2003) introduce the concept of benign paternalism. The idea here is to encourage
the individual to undertake socially desirable actions, without violating individual liberty
to make the decision. The idea is made operational by introducing small hurdles in the
way of harmful individuals choices in order to shepherd them in a better direction.9 Jolls
et al (1998) coin the term anti-antipaternalism which rejects the idea of pure libertari-
anism. O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2003) advocate the idea of optimal paternalism which
advocates taking account of all costs and bene￿ts of paternalism. They reject the view
example, Kahneman and Tversky (2000, section 9). Thus all utilities in this paper are decision utilities.
8Camerer et. al. (2003) illustrate the usefulness of their approach for boundedly rational individuals
in several contexts such as the following. Setting default options which encourage savings behavior and
protect insurance rights, framing of contracts to include seemingly irrelevant information, disclosure issues,
etc.
9For instance, gamblers are asked to choose up-front a level of liquidity which cannot be subsequently
exceeded when they might be in a tempted state. Gamblers without subsequent self control problems will
not need to be disciplined so they have no problems with setting liquidity limits, while gamblers with
subsequent self control problems will clearly bene￿t from these up-front limits.
4that interventions should be minimal. In their words: ￿In some instances, even seemingly
large deviations from the policy that is optimal for fully rational economic agents would
not cause severe harm to those agents. In such cases, even a small probability of people
making errors can have dramatic e⁄ects for optimal policy.￿
1.4. Liberalism, paternalism and context dependence of preferences
In section 1.3 we have illustrated the increasing appeal of paternalism (as opposed to liber-
alism) in conducting welfare analysis when individuals have bounded rationality. However,
non-paternalism10 is a fundamental principle of liberalism: individuals are the best judges
of their own welfare. It is also a fundamental assumption of social choice theory, welfare
economics and mechanism design.11 In its weakest and most general form, non-paternalism
is expressed by the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function:
W (x) = F (u1 (x);u2 (x);:::;uI (x)) (Bergson-Samuelson), (1.1)
where x is a social state, I is the number of individuals in society and ui (x) is the utility of
individual i as seen by that individual. A special case of (1.1) is that of constant elasticity:
W (x) =
1
1 ￿ ￿
I X
i=1
￿i [ui (x)]
1￿￿ , ￿ 6= 1, ￿i ￿ 1, ui (x) > 0 (constant elasticity), (1.2)
where the government exhibits a degree of paternalism in that (1) it may give di⁄erent
weights to di⁄erent individuals and (2) it may exhibit a degree of inequality aversion
(captured by ￿) di⁄erent from that exhibited by an individual (as captured by ui (x)).
Further specialization of (1.2) gives the two forms we shall use in this paper12:
W (x) = ui (x) (representative agent), (1.3)
W (x) =
I X
i=1
ui (x) (utilitarian or Benthamite), (1.4)
Form (1.4) may be viewed as the most liberal of the above, as the government gives
equal weight to all individuals and does not modify any of the individual utility functions.
A number of axiomatizations lead to (1.4).13
10Also known as welfarism or individualism.
11See, for example, chapters 21, 22 and 23 in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995).
12We prefer the term representative agent to dictator. First, individual i may be di⁄erent from the
decision maker. Second, even if individual i is the decision maker, he/she might be selected by a democratic
process, say an election.
13For example, Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1975) derived (1.4) using expected utility theory and a ￿ behind the
veil of ignorance￿argument. D￿ Aspremont and Gevers (1977) derived (1.4) from cardinal measurability
5We shall argue that the evidence on tax evasion is best explained by the following
combination. We use PT to model the tax evasion decision and derive the government
budget constraint. The government then chooses the tax rate that maximizes social wel-
fare. Although the government recognizes that the tax evasion decision is best described
by PT, when it chooses the tax rate it assumes that society￿ s preference over private and
public provision, the ui (x) in (1.3) or (1.4), is given by standard utility theory. We could
defend this methodology in either of two ways. The ￿rst is more traditional while the latter
relies on emerging empirical evidence. Our results do not hinge on which interpretation
we adopt. Readers of di⁄erent persuasions will have a preference for one or the other.
1. The government, when choosing the tax rate, behaves paternalistically, i.e., the
government assumes that it has better knowledge of the true welfare of individuals than
the individuals themselves.
2. Paternalism can have negative connotations (see our second quote at the beginning
of the paper). Hence, our own preference is for an alternative view that draws inspiration
from a very large body of empirical evidence that has been generated in behavioral eco-
nomics. In particular, the evidence suggests, very clearly, that individuals do not have a
complete preference ordering over all states and that preferences are heavily context depen-
dent. Alternative contexts can arise, for instance, from the framing of choices.14 Context
dependent preferences do not go away once professionals are presented with choices that
they must make on a regular basis.15 The mental accounting literature pioneered by
Richard Thaler is also suggestive of context dependent preferences.16 Individuals, when
making a private consumption decision might act so as to maximize their sel￿sh interest.
But in a separate role (context), say, as part of the government, as a school governor or
as a voter, could act so as to maximize some notion of public well being. Many examples
can be given.
1. Individuals might send their own children to private schools (self interest) but could
at the same time vote for more funding to government run schools in local or national
with unit comparability, non-paternalism, the strong Pareto principle and anonymity (or symmetry).
Maskin (1978) derived (1.4) from cardinal measurability, non-paternalism, the strong Pareto principle,
anonymity, separability of indi⁄erent households, continuity and strong equity. Other axiomatizations
lead to other special forms of (1.1). For a review see, for examples, chapters 5 and 6 of Boadway and
Bruce (1984).
14The following is just one example out of hundreds described in Kahneman and Tversky (2000). It is
problems 9 and 10 from Quattrone and Tversky (1988). In a survey, 64% of respondents thought that an
increase in in￿ ation from 12% to 17% was acceptable if it lead to a reduction in unemployment from 10%
to 5%. However, only 46% of the respondents thought that exactly the same increase in in￿ ation (from
12% to 17%) was acceptable if it increased employment from 90% to 95%.
15In a well known example, Kahneman and Tversky ￿nd, in the context of medical decisions, that the
choice between various programs depends on whether the choices are posed in terms of lives saved or lives
lost (see page 5 in Kahneman and Tversky (2000)).
16See Part 4 of the book by Kahneman and Tversky (2000).
6elections (public interest).
2. In making their labor supply decision, individuals might tradeo⁄personal utility from
consumption with disutility from labor supply. But the same individual, in his/ her
voting choice, might vote for redistributive policies that exhibit public concern (and
not purely private self interest).
3. An individual, when buying an air ticket, might also buy travel insurance, thus
exhibiting risk averse behavior. But, the same individual, when he reaches his holiday
destination, may visit a gambling casino and exhibit risk loving behavior there.
Using this view, we can assume that individuals, when taking their tax evasion de-
cision, exhibit behavior described by PT. But when individuals express their preferences
over private and public provision (through, say, surveys, referenda, elections, etc.), these
preferences are described by standard utility theory. This could be formalised by allowing
the utility function, U (z;:), to depend on a context variable, z. So in our case, for example,
z = 1 when an individual is deciding how much tax to evade but z = 2 when the same
individual is voting for a tax system.
1.5. Results and schematic outline
The results are as follows. Under both EUT and PT, taxpayers evade less as the audit
probability and the penalty rate increase. Under PT, additionally, one gets the plausible
result that taxpayers evade more if the tax rate increases. Using EUT to model both tax
evasion and government behavior is unable to jointly account for the evidence on actual
tax gaps and government expenditure. Given actual penalty rates and audit probabilities,
if consumer preferences over private versus public consumption yield observed government
expenditures, then EUT predicts far too big a tax gap. On the other hand, if consumer
preferences over private and public consumption yield observed tax gaps, then EUT pre-
dicts far too much government expenditure. Using PT to model both tax evasion and
government behavior gives economically absurd results. By contrast, using PT to model
the tax evasion decision and standard utility theory to explain government behavior, we
have no di¢ culty reconciling observed tax gaps with observed government expenditures,
at plausible tax rates.
Section 2 describes the basic model. Sections 3 and 4 consider the tax evasion decision
on the basis of EUT and PT, respectively. Sections 5 and 6 derive the resulting optimal tax
rates under EUT and PT, respectively. Section 7 compares the success of PT in explaining
tax evasion with that of EUT. Finally, section 8 summarizes and concludes.
72. The Model
We consider an economy consisting of a continuum of consumer-taxpayers located on the
unit square ￿ = [0;1] ￿ [0;1]. Pretax income is exogenous and is given by the density
function, Y (x;s) ￿ 0, x 2 [0;1], s 2 [0;1], where s (explained in more detail below)
captures the stigma faced by a tax evader when caught and x is purely a label that helps
locate an individual taxpayer.17 The government levies tax at the constant rate t 2 [0;1]
on declared income and uses its tax revenue to ￿nance the public provision of goods and
services whose aggregate monetary value is G.18
The consumer-taxpayer located at (x;s) declares income D(t;G;x;s)dxds, D(t;G;x;s) 2
[0;Y (x;s)]. Thus D(t;G;x;s) is the density of declared income. Subsequent to the ￿ling
of tax returns, an exogenous fraction p 2 (0;1) of the taxpayers are audited, and the
audit reveals the true taxable income. If caught, the dishonest taxpayer must pay the
outstanding tax liabilities t[Y (x;s) ￿ D(t;G;x;s)]dxds and a penalty proportional to
unpaid taxes, ￿t[Y (x;s) ￿ D(t;G;x;s)]dxds, where ￿ > 0 is the constant penalty rate.
The density of tax revenue is then
T (t;G;x;s) = tD(t;G;x;s) + p(1 + ￿)t[Y (x;s) ￿ D(t;G;x;s)]. (2.1)
Clearly, D and T depend on p and ￿ as well as t, G, x and s.
2.1. Sequence of moves
The sequence of moves is as follows.
1. The tax authority announces the tax rate, t, the audit probability, p, the penalty
rate, ￿, and the monetary value of the provision of publicly provided goods/services,
G.
2. Taxpayers make the decision to either report full income or evade a fraction of it,
given t, p, ￿ and G.
3. The government audits a fraction p of the returns and dishonest taxpayers are re-
quired to give up a fraction 1 + ￿ of their unreported income.
17In the discrete case, x could denote the individual￿ s social security number or his national insurance
number which uniquely locates the individual.
18Since ￿ is of unit area, G can be interpreted as either the aggregate or the per capita monetary value
of all publicly provided goods and services.
82.2. Exogenous and endogenous variables
The exogenous variables of the model are the probability of an audit, p (which, here, is
the same as the probability of detection), the penalty rate, ￿, and the density function
of income, Y . When considering tax evasion under prospect theory, we shall introduce
and explain the further exogenous variables ￿, ￿ and ￿. The endogenous variables of the
model are the tax rate, t, the density function of declared income, D, and the tax revenue
density function, T. When the consumer-taxpayer makes his tax evasion decision, he takes
as exogenous the model parameters, his location, (x;s), the tax rate, t, and the level of
public provision, G.
Notation: To simplify notation, we shall suppress reference to the model parameters and
drop the in￿nitesimal quantities, dx and ds, when such omission is not likely to lead
to confusion.
2.3. Government tax revenue
We assume that Y is integrable19. It will follow from optimizing behavior of consumer-
taxpayers that D is integrable. Hence, T is also integrable. Let S ￿ ￿ be measurable20.
Then the aggregate pretax income of all consumer-taxpayers in S is given by
Y (S) =
Z Z
(x;s)2S
Y (x;s)dsdx, (2.2)
and the tax revenue collected from them is
T (t;G;S) =
Z Z
(x;s)2S
tD(t;G;x;s)dxds
+p(1 + ￿)
Z Z
(x;s)2S
t[Y (x;s) ￿ D(t;G;x;s)]dxds. (2.3)
In particular, let
Y = Y (￿) =
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=0
Y (x;s)dsdx, (2.4)
and
T (t;G) = T (t;G;￿) =
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=0
tD(t;G;x;s)dxds
+p(1 + ￿)
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=0
t[Y (x;s) ￿ D(t;G;x;s)]dxds, (2.5)
19Integrability can be interpreted either in the sense of Riemann or Lebesgue, it does not matter for
our purposes which interpretation is chosen. However, the Lebesgue integral is more general than that of
Riemann, in that it is de￿ned for wider classes of functions and domains of integration. It is also associated
with powerful convergence theorems. A particularly clear introduction is Bartle (1966).
20Measurable in the sense of Borel or Lebesgue. Any set of interest to us will be measurable in both
senses.
9then Y is both total income and average income. Likewise, T (t;G) is both total and
average tax revenue. We assume that Y > 0.
Note that if S is of measure zero then Y (S) = 0 and, hence, also T (t;G;S) =
0. In particular, the tax revenue collected from any single individual, (x;s), is zero:
T (t;G;f(x;s)g) = 0. This ensures that we can consistently assume that when a taxpayer
decides how much income to declare, he can take public provision, G, as given.21
Thus the government￿ s tax revenue, T (t;G), comes from three sources:
1. taxes on declared income,
R 1
x=0
R 1
s=0 tD(t;G;x;s)dxds,
2. taxes recovered fromthose caught evading, p
R 1
x=0
R 1
s=0 t[Y (x;s) ￿ D(t;G;x;s)]dxds,
and
3. ￿nes from those caught evading, p￿
R 1
x=0
R 1
s=0 t[Y (x;s) ￿ D(t;G;x;s)]dxds.
From (2.4) and (2.5), we see that total tax revenue can be written in the slightly simpler
form:
T (t;G) = tp(1 + ￿)Y + t[1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)]
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=0
D(t;G;x;s)dxds. (2.6)
It will be useful to distinguish between those who are unable to evade tax, and those
who can evade but choose not to. Therefore, assume taxes are deducted at source for a
fraction, !, of the population, where
0 ￿ ! ￿ 1, (2.7)
so, these taxpayers cannot evade (if ! = 1, then nobody can evade).
We make the following two simplifying assumptions.
A1. The opportunity to evade taxes does not depend on the taxpayer￿ s income: Thus,
Y (x;s) does not depend on !. Hence, the tax revenue collected from the consumer-
taxpayers in S ￿ ￿ is given by
T (t;G;S) = !t
Z Z
(x;s)2S
Y dxds
+(1 ￿ !)t
￿Z Z
(x;s)2S
Ddxds + p(1 + ￿)
Z Z
(x;s)2S
[Y ￿ D]dxds
￿
, (2.8)
21To be absolutely clear, T (t;G;x;s) is the density of tax revenue at (x;s). If t > 0 and D(t;G;x;s) > 0,
then T (t;G;x;s) > 0. However, the tax revenue collected from (x;s), T (t;G;f(x;s)g), is zero. A useful
intuitive picture to retain in mind is T (t;G;f(x;s)g) = T (t;G;x;s)dxdy, where T (t;G;x;s) > 0 but
T (t;G;f(x;s)g) = 0 because the ￿ in￿nitesimal rectangle￿ , dxdy, has zero area. Such ideas can be made
rigorous using Non-standard analysis, which was invented for such purpose; see, for example, Loeb and
Wol⁄ (2000).
10which simpli￿es to
T (t;G;S) = [! + p(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ !)]t
Z Z
(x;s)2S
Y dxds
+(1 ￿ !)[1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)]t
Z Z
(x;s)2S
Ddxds. (2.9)
Total tax revenue becomes
T (t;G) = T (t;G;￿)
= [! + p(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ !)]Y t + (1 ￿ !)[1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)]t
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=0
Ddxds.
(2.10)
A2. Stigma is unrelated to income: Although di⁄erent people su⁄er di⁄erent rates of
stigma, we do not know of any strong evidence that this is related to income, e.g.,
we do not know of any strong evidence that rich persons su⁄er higher, or lower, rates
of stigma than poor persons, on account of their income.22 Our second simplifying
assumption is, therefore, that the income density function, Y (x;s), is independent
of s. From (2.4) we get
Y =
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=0
Y dsdx =
Z 1
x=0
Y
￿Z 1
s=0
ds
￿
dx =
Z 1
x=0
Y dx. (2.11)
The independence of income, stigma and the ability to evade, will give rise to simple
expressions for total tax revenue and aggregate utility.
2.4. Behavior of government and consumer-taxpayers
The tax authority moves ￿rst, making an announcement of the tax rate, t, the audit
probability, p, the penalty rate, ￿, and the total monetary value of all publicly provided
goods and services, G. Given t, p, ￿ and G, the taxpayer then makes the decision to either
report full income (D = Y ) or evade a fraction of it (D < Y ). Let YNC be the after tax
income of the taxpayer if he is not caught, then
YNC = Y ￿ tD, with probability 1 ￿ p. (2.12)
If evasion is discovered, the taxpayer also su⁄ers some stigma, whose monetary value
is s(Y ￿D), where s is the stigma rate on evaded income, s 2 [0;1]. As in Gordon (1989)
22See Slemrod (2007, p30) for a review of this.
11and Besley and Coate (1992), such stigma enters linearly, as a monetary equivalent, into
the payo⁄ in that state of the world23. His after-tax income is then YC, given by
YC = (1 ￿ t)Y ￿ (s + ￿t)(Y ￿ D), with probability p. (2.13)
The government spends the total tax revenue, T (t;G), given by (2.6), on providing
goods and services under the balanced budget constraint,
T (t;G) = G. (2.14)
Consumers derive utility from private consumption and the publicly provided goods
and services. However, when making the decision on how much income to declare, a
consumer takes the publicly provided goods and services as given. Thus we have a free-
rider problem: each consumer derives utility from public provision, but hopes others will
pay for it. The government chooses the tax rate, t, so as to maximize social welfare, taking
into account the utility individuals derive from private and public consumption and the
e⁄ect of the tax rate on tax evasion and, hence, on tax revenue.
We shall consider ￿ve regimes, summarized in Table-I below. We use the shorthand
notation CARA for constant absolute risk aversion and log for logarithmic utility.
Table-I: Classi￿cation of regimes
Regime Taxpayer preferences Government preferences
EUT EU: complete EU, representative consumer, separable, log
PT1 PT: context dependent EU, representative consumer, separable, log
PT2 PT: context dependent EU, representative consumer, non-separable
PT3 PT: context dependent EU, utilitarian, separable, CARA
PT4 PT: complete PT, utilitarian
We now describe the ￿ve regimes more fully. The description will rely heavily on the
arguments developed in the introduction; see in particular section 1.4.
1. Regime EUT: The second row of Table-I describes regime EUT. In this regime,
consumer preferences over private provision, C, and public provision, G, are given
by the tractable form:
U (C;G) = ￿lnG + (1 ￿ ￿)lnC, 0 < ￿ < 1, G > 0, C > 0, (2.15)
Expected utility is then
EU = ￿lnG + (1 ￿ ￿)[plnYC + (1 ￿ p)lnYNC], (2.16)
23Although a natural interpretation of stigma might include factors such as the tug on one￿ s conscience
and loss of face among family and community etc., other interpretations of stigma are possible. These
might include, in an appropriately speci￿ed dynamic game, the reputational costs that impinge on current
and future earnings. For a more detailed discussion of stigma in the context of tax evasion as well as a
more general formulation, see Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007).
12where YC and YNC are given by (2.13) and (2.12), respectively.
Maximizing (2.16) gives the density function, D, of declared income and, hence, gov-
ernment tax revenue T (t;G). Thus, the consumer-taxpayer has a complete transitive
set of preferences: the same utility function describes both tax evasion and prefer-
ence between private and public provision. The government uses the same utility
function (2.15) to maximize the utility of a representative consumer with average
income, Y , who does not evade. In other words, we do not need to invoke context
dependence or paternalism to justify this regime. The details are given in section 3,
below. This regime turns out to perform poorly in jointly explaining the tax rate,
the tax gap and government expenditure.
2. Regime PT1: The third row of Table-I describes regime PT1. In this regime, con-
sumer preferences over private and public provision are given by the same utility
function (2.15) as in regime EUT. However, when making the tax evasion decision,
consumer preferences are not given by expected utility (2.16) but by prospect theory
(PT), as described in section 4, below. Thus, the consumer-taxpayer has context-
dependent preferences (see the introduction): the utility function which describes tax
evasion behavior is di⁄erent from that which gives preferences between private and
public provision. The government uses the same utility function (2.15), as in regime
EUT, to maximize the utility of a representative consumer with average income, Y ,
who does not evade. The details are given in section 4, below.24 As discussed in the
introduction, one could invoke paternalism or incomplete preferences to justify this
approach. In contrast to regime EUT, regime PT1 successfully explains the tax rate,
the tax gap and the level of government expenditure.
3. Regime PT2: The utility function (2.15) is additively separable over private and
public provision. However, in actual practice, there would seem to be strong comple-
mentarities between the two. For example, utility derived from private car ownership
heavily depends on the quality of publicly provided roads. We would like to investi-
gate the consequences of recognizing this complementarity. The fourth row of Table-I
describes regime PT2. In this regime, consumer preferences over private and public
provision are given by the utility function:
U (C;G) = F
￿
C ￿
B
G
￿
, F
0 > 0, F
00 < 0, G > 0, 0 <
B
G
< C, (2.17)
For example, F
￿
C ￿ B
G
￿
= ln
￿
C ￿ B
G
￿
. An interpretation of this model is that public
provision, G, has value only insofar as it facilitates private consumption, C. When
24How the government discovers that (2.15) correctly describes a consumer￿ s preference between private
and public provision, is not modelled in this paper (it could be through, e.g., surveys, elections, referenda,
observing relevant market behavior, etc.).
13making the tax evasion decision, consumer preferences are given by prospect theory,
as in regime PT1. Thus, the consumer-taxpayer, again, exhibits context-dependent
preferences. The government uses the utility function (2.17) to maximize the utility
of a representative consumer with average income, Y , who does not evade. The
details are given in section 4, below. The results are very similar to that of regime
PT2.
4. Regime PT3: The ￿fth row of Table-I describes regime PT3. In this regime consumer
preferences over private and public provision are given by the utility function:
U (C;G) =
￿
￿G1￿￿
1￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) C1￿￿
1￿￿ ; ￿ 6= 1
￿lnG + (1 ￿ ￿)lnC; ￿ = 1
(2.18)
where 0 < ￿ < 1, G > 0, C > 0. When making the tax evasion decision, consumer
preferences are given by prospect theory, as in regimes PT1 and PT2. Thus, the
consumer-taxpayer, again, exhibits context-dependent preferences. The government
uses the utility function (2.18) to maximize the sum (in the form of an integral) of
the utilities of all the consumers in the state in which they do not evade. The details
are given in section 4, below. Note that regime PT3 di⁄ers from regimes EUT and
PT1 in two ways: the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, ￿, can now take any value
(not just 1) and the government now maximizes the sum of all utilities, not that of
a representative consumer. Yet the result is very close to those of regimes PT1 and
PT2 and regime PT3 successfully explains the tax rate, tax gap and government
expenditure.
5. Regime PT4: The last row of Table-I describes regime PT4. In this regime, when
taking the tax evasion decision, consumer preferences are given by prospect theory,
as in regimes PT1, PT2 and PT3. However, the government also uses these same
prospect theory preferences to maximize the sum of the utilities of all the consumers.
The details are given in section 4, below. As in regime EUT, we do not need to
invoke either context dependence or paternalism. The results turn out not only to
be empirically incorrect (as in regime EUT) but also economically absurd.
To summarize, in the context of the simple model of this paper, EUT cannot reconcile
the observed tax rate, tax gap and the level of government expenditure. At the other
extreme, modelling both the tax evasion decision and government behavior using PT gives
absurd results. The best results are obtained by using PT to model tax evasion behavior
but standard utility theory to model government behavior. The key is to recognize the
context dependence of preferences.
143. The Taxpayer￿ s Tax Evasion Problem: Expected Utility Theory
Consider the case of a consumer-taxpayer located at (x;s) who derives utility, U (C;G),
from private consumption, C, and the level of public provision, G. Given his income,
Y (x;s), the level of public provision, G, and the values of the parameters t, p, ￿, and
s, the consumer chooses the amount of income to declare, D. If he is not caught (with
probability 1 ￿ p), then his disposable income, and hence private consumption, is YNC.
However, if he is caught (with probability p), then his disposable income, hence private
consumption, is YC. His expected utility is thus
EU = pU (YC;G) + (1 ￿ p)U (YNC;G), (3.1)
where YC and YNC are given by (2.13) and (2.12), respectively.25
3.1. The Yitzhaki result
Eliminate D from (2.13) and (2.12) to get
1
1 +
￿
s
t + ￿
￿YC +
s
t + ￿
1 +
￿
s
t + ￿
￿YNC = (1 ￿ t)Y . (3.2)
For the special case of no stigma, s = 0, (3.2) reduces to
1
1 + ￿
YC +
￿
1 + ￿
YNC = (1 ￿ t)Y . (3.3)
We may view the problem as choosing YC and YNC so as to maximize expected utility
(3.1) subject to the budget constraint (3.3), given income (1 ￿ t)Y and prices 1
1+￿ and
￿
1+￿. Since prices do not depend on the tax rate, t, an increase in the tax rate has a
pure income e⁄ect. Making the plausible assumption of constant or declining absolute risk
aversion, we get that an increase in the tax rate reduces tax evasion.26
In the more general case with stigma, (3.2), a change in the tax rate will have both
income and substitution e⁄ects. However, simulations with plausible functional forms and
parameter values indicate that in the presence of stigma, an increase in the tax rate causes
a decline in evasion under EUT.27
This result, obtained by Yitzhaki (1974), is rejected by the bulk of experimental, econo-
metric and survey evidence.28
25Obviously, EU depends on D, G, x, s, t, ￿, ￿, s, and p. We have omitted reference to these to reduce
the burden of notation.
26For a formal proof see, for example, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007, Proposition 2). Along with con-
stant or declining absolute risk aversion, we also need the assumptions 0 ￿ D ￿ Y ,
h
@EU(D)
@D
i
D=0
> 0,
h
@EU(D)
@D
i
D=Y
< 0,
@
2EU(D)
@D2 < 0, p > 0, ￿ > 0 and t > 0.
27See below and Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007).
28See, for example, Friedland et al. (1978), Clotfelter (1983), Baldry (1987), Andreoni et al. (1998) and
Pudney et al. (2000). However, a notable exception is Feinstein (1991).
153.2. Tax evasion under EUT
As described above in section 2.4, in the regime EUT when the taxpayer uses EUT, the pref-
erences over private and public goods consumption are given by (2.15) and expected utility
is given by (2.16). Note that expected utility (2.16) di⁄ers across consumer-taxpayers only
in so far as they di⁄er in income, Y (x;s) and stigma, s. Di⁄erentiating (2.16) with respect
to D, using (2.12) and (2.13), gives
@EU
@D
= (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ p
YNC
@YNC
@D
+
p
YC
@YC
@D
￿
, (3.4)
@EU
@D
= (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(s + ￿t)
p
YC
￿ t
1 ￿ p
YNC
￿
, (3.5)
@2EU
@D2 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
"
p
￿
s + ￿t
YC
￿2
+ (1 ￿ p)
￿
t
YNC
￿2#
< 0. (3.6)
If t > 0, then (3.6) holds everywhere. However, if t = 0, then @2EU
@D2 = 0 at s = 0.
Hence, (3.6) holds almost everywhere. Since EU is continuous on the compact interval,
0 ￿ D ￿ Y (x;s), a maximum, D(t;G;x;s), exists. This maximum is unique except at
t = s = 0. The ￿rst order conditions for a maximum are
￿
@EU
@D
￿
D=0
￿ 0,
￿
@EU
@D
￿
0<D<Y (x;s)
= 0,
￿
@EU
@D
￿
D￿Y (x;s)
￿ 0. (3.7)
Let29
s1 = min
￿
1;max
￿
0;
(1 ￿ p)(t ￿ t2)
(t ￿ pt + p)
￿ ￿t
￿￿
, (3.8)
s2 = max
￿
s1;min
￿
1;
1 ￿ p
p
t ￿ ￿t
￿￿
. (3.9)
From (2.12), (2.13), (3.5), (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9) we get
0 ￿ s ￿ s1 ) D = 0
s1 < s < s2 ) D =
h
1 +
p
t ￿ p ￿
(1￿p)(1￿t)
s+￿t
i
Y
s2 ￿ s ￿ 1 ) D = Y
(3.10)
Thus, taxpayers who would su⁄er low stigma if caught (the interval 0 ￿ s ￿ s1) hide
all their income. Taxpayers who would su⁄er moderate stigma if caught (the interval
s1 < s < s2) hide some but not all income. Taxpayers who would su⁄er high stigma if
caught (the interval s2 ￿ s ￿ 1) declare all their income. Also note that declared income,
D, does not depend on the level of public provision, G. The latter result follows from
the facts that utility (2.15) is additively separable in private and public consumption and
the consumer-taxpayer takes public provision as given when deciding who much income to
declare.
29For p > 0 and 0 ￿ t ￿ 1, it can be shown that s1 ￿
1￿p
p t ￿ ￿t.
163.3. Tax revenue under EUT
From (3.10) we get:
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=0
Ddxds =
Z 1
x=0
Z s1
s=0
Ddsdx +
Z 1
x=0
Z s2
s=s1
Ddsdx +
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=s2
Ddsdx,
=
Z 1
x=0
Z s2
s=s1
￿
1 +
p
t
￿ p ￿
(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ t)
s + ￿t
￿
Y dsdx
+
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=s2
Y dsdx. (3.11)
We now invoke the assumption that income distribution, Y (x;s), is independent of stigma,
s, so that
R 1
x=0 Y (x;s)dx =
R 1
x=0 Y (x)dx = Y . Hence, (3.11) becomes
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=0
Ddxds = Y
Z s2
s=s1
￿
1 +
p
t
￿ p ￿
(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ t)
s + ￿t
￿
ds + (1 ￿ s2)Y ,
=
h
1 ￿ s1 + (s2 ￿ s1)
￿p
t
￿ p
￿i
Y ￿ (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ t)Y
Z s2
s=s1
ds
s + ￿t
,
=
h
1 ￿ s1 + (s2 ￿ s1)
￿p
t
￿ p
￿i
Y
￿(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ t)Y [ln(s2 + ￿t) ￿ ln(s1 + ￿t)]. (3.12)
Letting
D(t) =
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=0
Ddxds, (3.13)
we get
D(t) =
h
1 ￿ s1 + (s2 ￿ s1)
￿p
t
￿ p
￿i
Y ￿ (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ t)Y [ln(s2 + ￿t) ￿ ln(s1 + ￿t)].
(3.14)
Substitute from (3.14) into (2.10), to get total tax revenue:
T (t;G) = [! + p(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ !)]Y t + (1 ￿ !)[1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)]tD(t). (3.15)
Now, impose the government budget constraint, T (t;G(t)) = G(t), to get total public
expenditure (which is also per capita public expenditure):
G(t) = [! + p(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ !)]Y t + (1 ￿ !)[1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)]tD(t). (3.16)
4. The Taxpayer￿ s Tax Evasion Problem: Prospect Theory
The preferences of the taxpayer under prospect theory are more complicated. Those
familiar with prospect theory should just skim the material in this section, skipping directly
17to (4.9) for the value function under PT. For those unfamiliar with PT, we provide a self-
contained treatment below.
The basic building blocks of prospect theory can be heuristically explained as follows.30
Prospect theory distinguishes between two phases in decision making: an editing phase,
followed by an evaluation phase. In the editing phase, a complex problem is ￿rst simpli￿ed
to facilitate decision making. In the evaluation phase, the highest value prospect is chosen.
During the editing phase outcomes are coded as gains or losses relative to a reference point.
The reference point is usually, but not necessarily, the status quo.31
While there is no general theory of the editing phase, prospect theory has a very precise
theory of the evaluation phase. Suppose that a consumer faces a lottery (or prospect) with
several possible outcomes. First, each outcome in the prospect is assigned a number, using
a utility function. This number is a positive real number if it has been coded as a gain
relative to the reference point, and a negative number if it has been coded as a loss
(the reference point having been arrived at in the editing phase). The utility function
under prospect theory has the following properties: continuity, monotonicity, reference
dependence, declining sensitivity and loss aversion. Continuity and monotonicity are as in
EUT.
Unlike EUT where the carriers of utility are ￿nal levels of wealth (or incomes or con-
sumption levels or commodities), under prospect theory the carriers of utility are gains and
losses relative to the reference point. Declining sensitivity means that the utility function
is concave in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. Loss aversion is
based on the idea that losses are more salient than gains. Given an amount of money,
y > 0, and a utility function, v(y), (to be speci￿ed precisely below) loss aversion implies
that v(y) > ￿v(￿y).
Finally, the utilities of each outcome in a prospect are aggregated using decision weights
into a value function. These decision weights are non-linear functions of the cumulative
probabilities. Probabilities in the two domains (gains and losses) being cumulated sepa-
rately. The probability weighting function used for the domain of gains need not be the
same as that for losses. Decision weights are not probabilities and do not, necessarily, add
up to one (unlike EUT). However, if all outcomes are either in the domain of gains or if
all are in the domain of losses, then decision weights do add up to one and can be inter-
preted as probabilities. Agents facing uncertain situations overweight small probabilities
but underweight large ones.32. In choosing among several prospects, an individual using
30There is a substantial body of evidence in support of these building blocks of prospect theory, as well
as a mounting number of successful applications in economics; see, for instance, the collection of papers
in Kahneman and Tversky (2000) and in Camerer et al. (2004).
31Also in the editing phase it is decided which low probability events to ignore and which high probability
events to treat as certain.
32In Kahneman and Tversky (1979) decision weights are transformed probabilities. This proved unsatis-
18PT chooses the one that gives rise to a higher number for the value function.
We now provide a more formal treatment of the building blocks of prospect theory.
4.1. Utility of an outcome under PT
Since the consumer takes public provision as given when deciding how much tax to evade,
let us assume that public provision is ignored in the editing phase. Let the reference private
consumption of the taxpayer be R. Then private consumption relative to the reference
point is
Xi = Yi ￿ R, i = C;NC. (4.1)
As in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the utility,
v(Xi), associated with an outcome Xi is given by
v(Xi) =
￿
X
￿
i if Xi ￿ 0,
￿￿(￿Xi)
￿ if Xi < 0,
(4.2)
where ￿ > 1 is the parameter of loss aversion; it ensures that a loss is more salient than a
gain of equal monetarily value. Based on experimental evidence, Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) suggests that ￿ ’ 0:88 and ￿ ’ 2:25.33
4.2. The reference point under PT
Although prospect theory does not provide su¢ cient guidance to determine the reference
point in each possible situation, there is often a plausible candidate for a reference point.
Indeed, specifying a suitable reference point is often essential for a successful application
of prospect theory.
As in Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007), we take the legal after-tax income (which is also
the level of private consumption expenditure in the absence of tax evasion) as the reference
point in this paper.34 Hence,
R = (1 ￿ t)Y . (4.3)
factory. So, in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), decision weights are transformed cumulative probabilities.
This produced cumulative prospect theory (CPT). However, since we have exactly one outcome in the
domain of gains and exactly one outcome in the domain of losses, CPT reduces to PT. If non-linear
transformation of cumulative probabilities is combined with EUT, we get rank dependent expected utility
(RDEU). The attraction of RDEU is that it can be regarded as EUT applied to the transformed cumu-
lative probability distribution. Hence, the whole machinery of analysis of risk developed for EUT can be
transferred to RDEU. See Quiggin (1993) for details. While RDEU can explain some anomalies of EUT
it cannot explain others. For the latter, we need PT. For application of RDEU to tax evasion, see Eide
(2001).
33See al-Nowaihi, Bradley and Dhami (2007) for an axiomatic derivation of the form (4.2).
34Arguments for this particular reference point are given in Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007). Alternative
reference points are analyzed in Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004).
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Figure 4.1: Plot of prospect theory preferences for ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = 2:5
4.3. The decision problem under PT
From (4.1), (4.3) XNC = YNC ￿ (1 ￿ t)Y and XC = YC ￿ (1 ￿ t)Y . Then, using (2.12),
(2.13) and recalling that 0 ￿ D ￿ Y , we get
XNC = t(Y ￿ D) ￿ 0, (4.4)
XC = ￿(s + ￿t)(Y ￿ D) ￿ 0. (4.5)
Hence, the taxpayer is in the domain of losses if caught but in the domain of gains if not
caught. Let v be the taxpayer￿ s value function and w+, w￿ be her probability weighting
function for the domains of gains and losses, respectively.35 Then, according to prospect
theory (PT), the taxpayer maximizes:
V = w
￿(p)v (XC) + w
+(1 ￿ p)v (XNC), (4.6)
Comparing (4.6) with the analogous expression (3.1) for expected utility theory, we see
the following di⁄erences. First, the carriers of utility in PT are gains and losses relative
to the reference point rather than ￿nal levels. Second, one uses decision weights in PT to
aggregate outcomes while one uses objective probabilities under expected utility theory.
35By a probability weighting function we mean a strictly increasing function w : [0;1]
onto ￿! [0;1]: Note
that a probability weighting function, w, has a unique inverse, w￿1 : [0;1]
onto ￿! [0;1] and that w￿1 is strictly
increasing. Furthermore, it follows that w and w￿1 are continuous and must satisfy w(0) = w￿1 (0) = 0
and w(1) = w￿1 (1) = 1: For an example of a probability weighting function, see below.
20Third, the level of public provision, G, is present in (3.1) but absent for (4.6). This is
because, in EUT, a decision maker has a complete preference relation over all outcomes.
From (4.2), (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6) we get:
V = t
￿ (Y ￿ D)
￿ w
+(1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿(s + ￿t)
￿ (Y ￿ D)
￿ w
￿(p). (4.7)
4.4. The probability weighting function
Empirical evidence is widely consistent with an inverted S shaped form for the weighting
function; see for example Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
and Prelec (1998). Denoting by p the cumulative probability, Prelec (1998) derives the
following weighting function (see Figure 4.2).36 By the Prelec function we mean the
probability weighting function w : [0;1]
onto ￿! [0;1] given by37:
w(p) = w
+(p) = w
￿(p) = exp[￿(￿lnp)
￿], (4.8)
where 0 < ￿ ￿ 1. The smaller ￿ is, the more the overweighting of small probabilities
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Figure 4.2: A graph of the Prelec weighting function for ￿ = 0:225
36There are several advantages in using the Prelec weighting function, relative to the others suggested
in the literature. First, it has an inverted S shape which is consistent with experimental evidence. Second,
it is based on axiomatic foundations; see Prelec (1998), Luce (2001) and al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2006).
Third, it has the same form for gains and losses.
37To quote from Prelec (1998, last line of Appendix A): ￿Empirically ... one observes w+ (p) = w￿ (p).￿
Therefore, in our calibration exercises, we shall take w+ (p) = w￿ (p).
21and w(p) ! p as ￿ ! 1. Thus, the weights approach objective probabilities as ￿ ! 1.38
Figure 4.2 plots the Prelec function for ￿ = 0:225.39
4.5. Tax evasion under PT
Substituting (4.8) in (4.7) we get
V = t
￿ (Y ￿ D)
￿ w
+(1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿(s + ￿t)
￿ (Y ￿ D)
￿ w
￿(p). (4.9)
Let
  =
￿
w+(1 ￿ p)
￿w￿(p)
￿ 1
￿
￿ ￿, (4.10)
sc = 0 if  t ￿ 0
sc =  t if 0 <  t < 1
sc = 1 if  t ￿ 1
(4.11)
then (4.9) can be written as:
V = ￿w
￿(p)
h
(sc + ￿t)
￿ ￿ (s + ￿t)
￿
i
(Y ￿ D)
￿ . (4.12)
From (4.12), we see that optimal values of D are
Case-I: D = 0 if s < sc,
Case-II: any D 2 [0;Y ] if s = sc,
Case-III: D = Y if s > sc.
(4.13)
The solution to the tax evasion problem under PT, when the probability of detection is
￿xed, is a bang-bang (or corner) solution. We would argue that the bang-bang solution
seems descriptive of several forms of tax evasion which take the form of hiding certain
activities completely from the tax authorities while fully declaring other sources. For
instance, an academic might not report income arising from an invited but paid lecture.
A school teacher might not report tuition income for after-school lessons. A householder
might pay cash to a builder for a minor extension of the house. Line item reporting
of tax returns might further encourage this behavior. This, bang-bang, implication of
reporting taxable income can also be drawn from the experimental results of Pudney
38There is no reason to suppose that di⁄erent uncertain situations should have the same ￿, hence,
prospect theory does not impose an exact value on ￿. For instance, people might overweight the probability
of dying in an air crash far higher relative to dying in a car accident.
39Based on experimental data, Prelec (1998) estimates ￿ ’ 0:65. However, Bernasconi (1998) argues
that, because of ambiguity aversion, taxpayers ￿ in the wild￿would exhibit more overweighting of low
probabilities than in the laboratory. Bernasconi (1998) reports that, while actual probabilities of audits
are in the range 0:01 to 0:03, an average of USA taxpayers￿assessments of the audit probability is 0:09.
Taking a central value, this gives the value ￿ = 0:225 that we use.
22et al. (2000). Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) ￿nd, based on TCMP data for 1988, that
￿the voluntary reporting percentage was 99.5% for wages and salaries, but only 41.4%
for self-employment income￿ . Additional support comes from the behavior of non-pro￿t
organizations whose pro￿ts from activities unrelated to their primary tax exempt purpose
are subject to federal and state tax. The reporting behavior of such organizations is also
suggestive of the bang-bang solution; see Omer and Yetman (2002).40
Assuming non-increasing absolute risk aversion, EUT predicts (Yitzhaki, 1974) that
individuals evade less income as the tax rate increases. On the other hand, PT predicts
the more factual result that tax evasion increases with an increase in the tax rate. This is
formally stated in Proposition 1 below. The proof of this, and other results, can be found
in Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007).
Proposition 1 : Ceteris-paribus, 9 t = tc 2 [0;1] such that the individual does not evade
taxes if t < tc but evades taxes if t > tc.
Consider the more general case of an endogenous probability of detection p(D) such
that p(D) is continuously di⁄erentiable and p0 (D) ￿ 0: In this case the declared income
can have an interior solution and varies continuously with the exogenous parameters. The
comparative static results in this section, including, in particular, the explanation of the
Yitzhaki puzzle, can also be demonstrated for the more general case.41 However, the
general case is not very conducive for undertaking calibration exercises which is the main
method we use for distinguishing among alternative theories.42
40Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) introduce an endogenous probability of detection p(D) such that p(D)
is continuously di⁄erentiable and p0 (D) ￿ 0 i.e. the taxpayer is more likely to be caught if s(he) evades
more. This induces enough curvature in the model for interior solutions. However, this does not alter the
comparative static results.
41For the general case, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007, Proposition 4) prove the following: (a) At a regular
interior optimum, tax evasion is strictly decreasing in the punishment rate, ￿, the stigma rate, s, and the
coe¢ cient of loss aversion, ￿. However, tax evasion is strictly increasing in the tax rate, t.
(b) At an optimum on the boundary (D￿ = 0 or D￿ = Y ), tax evasion is non-increasing in the punishment
rate, ￿, the stigma rate, s, and the coe¢ cient of loss aversion, ￿. Tax evasion is non-decreasing in the tax
rate, t.
42Even in macroeconomics where calibration is most prevalent, despite the non-linearities it is usually
the simpli￿ed log-linearized version of the model that is used in the calibration exercises.
234.6. Tax revenue under PT
From (4.13) we get:
D(t) =
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=0
D(t;G;x;s)dxds
=
Z 1
x=0
Z sc
s=0
Ddxds +
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=sc
Ddxds
=
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=sc
Y dxds. (4.14)
Now, invoke our assumption that stigma is independent of pretax income, Y (x;s) = Y (x).
Then (2.11), (4.11) and (4.14), we get:
D(t) =
8
<
:
Y if  t ￿ 0
(1 ￿  t)Y if 0 <  t < 1
0 if  t ￿ 1
(4.15)
From (2.10), (4.15) and the government budget constraint, G = T (t;G), we get total tax
revenue:
G(t) =
8
<
:
Y t if  t ￿ 0
Y t[1 ￿ (1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)) t] if 0 <  t < 1
Y t[! + p(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ !)] if  t ￿ 1
(4.16)
5. Optimal tax under EUT (regime EUT)
We have, so far, considered the tax evasion decision of taxpayers when they respectively
following EUT and PT and also the associated tax revenues under each form of preferences.
We now analyze the optimal tax decision of a central planner under EUT.
The objective function of the government is explained in section 2.4 above, for the case
of regime EUT. It chooses the tax rate so as to maximize the utility of a representative
consumer, with average income, Y , in the state where he does not evade43:
U = ￿ln[G(t)] + (1 ￿ ￿)ln
￿
(1 ￿ t)Y
￿
, (5.1)
given the government budget constraint (3.16), where D(t), s1 and s2 are given by (3.14),
(3.8) and (3.9), respectively. We ￿nd the solution to this maximization problem by a
simple search over values of t 2 [0;1].
Calibration Values: We use the values p = 0:015 and ￿ = 0:5 that appear typical for
the USA (Alm et al. (1992), Andreoni et al. (1998), Bernasconi (1998)). From Slemrod
43Note that, like the family with 2.1 children, there may be no consumer in ￿ with average income, who
does not evade.
24and Yitzhaki (2002) and Andreoni et al. (1998) we can infer the value ! = 0:4. While the
general view seems to be that stigma costs from evasion are low, for example see Brooks
(2001), we are not aware of the exact magnitudes. Some evidence is available from stigma
costs that arises from claiming welfare bene￿ts. For Britain, Pudney et al. (2002) ￿nd
that the total stigma costs (which they de￿ne as stigma, hassle, search costs, etc.) range
from about 0:1 to 0:2. We do not know the appropriate value of ￿, which determines
society￿ s preference for public compared to private consumption.
Calibration Strategy: Our strategy is as follows. For values of ￿ in the interval (0;1),
we compute the optimal tax rate, the resulting level of tax revenue, G(t), and the tax
gap ratio,
tY ￿G(t)
G(t) , where the denominator is total tax revenue and the numerator (the tax
gap) is the di⁄erence between what is theoretically owed in taxes (tY ) and what is actually
collected in taxes (G(t)). For the USA, the tax gap ratio for 1992 was 0:222 and for 1998 it
was 0:199 (Americans for Fair Taxation). For the USA, total government tax revenue, as a
percentage of GDP was 32% for 2004 (Laurin, 2006). We use the normalization Y = 100.
Calibration Results: The calibration results are tabulated in Table-II.
Table-II (Optimal tax, tax gap and government spending under EUT)
￿ 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:41 0:5 0:6 0:65 0:7 0:8 0:9
t 0:10 0:22 0:37 0:52 0:54 0:66 0:73 0:77 0:80 0:87 0:94
s1 0:73 0:62 0:43 0:21 0:19 0:002 0 0 0 0 0
s2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G(t) 4:39 10:11 18:91 31:71 33:23 48:23 58:22 64:10 68:60 80:87 90:34
tY ￿G(t)
G(t) 1:28 1:18 0:94 0:64 0:61 0:37 0:25 0:20 0:17 0:09 0:04
From Table-II we see that as society￿ s desire for public provision (measured by ￿)
increases, so does the optimal tax rate, t, and government tax revenue, G(t). This result
is exactly what is expected. However, tax evasion as measured by the tax gap ratio,
tY ￿G(t)
G(t) , drops very dramatically with an increase in the tax rate, from the very high value
of 1:28 to the very low value of 0:04. Thus tax evasion can be practically eliminated by a
tax rate of almost 100%. This is the Yitzhaki puzzle under EUT described above.
From the fourth row we see that, at all tax rates, s2 = 1 (see (3.9), (3.10)), i.e., all
taxpayers who can evade, evade at least some tax. From the ￿rst column, we see that
s1 = 0:73 (see (3.8), (3.10)), i.e., of taxpayers who can evade, 73% evade all taxes. This
steadily declines as the tax rate increases so that for tax rates in excess of 73%; all tax
payers pay at least some tax.
From the ￿rst highlighted column, we see that at the tax rate t = 0:52; government
tax revenue is similar to actual values (G(0:52) = 31:71%, compared to the actual value of
32%). However, the predicted tax gap ratio is far too high (
0:52Y ￿G(0:52)
G(0:52) = 0:64, compared
25to the actual value of about 0:2). From the second highlighted column, we see that the tax
rate t = 0:77 gives a tax gap ratio close to that observed (
0:77Y ￿G(0:77)
G(0:77) = 0:2). However, the
same tax rate gives a total tax revenue (G(t) = 64:1%) that is about twice the observed
value. To summarize, our simple EUT optimal tax model with tax evasion can either get
tax revenue right or the tax gap right but not both.
We do not think that this result is merely the consequence of using a simple model,
but appears to be a problem inherent in the EUT approach to tax evasion. We give some
arguments in support of this:
1. (Risk aversion) The use of logarithmic utility entails a coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion of 1, which is rather low. What results can we expect when a government
assigns, in its social welfare function, a higher value for the coe¢ cient of risk aversion?
Bernasconi (1998) reports that coe¢ cients of relative risk aversion lie in the range
1 to 2. However, Skinner and Slemrod (1985) report that a coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion of 70 is needed to square the extent of tax evasion under EUT with the
evidence.44 Our simulations (see Section 7) support this, suggesting that increasing
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion to 2 would not make much di⁄erence.
2. (More general preferences) The simulations (see Section 7) also suggest that the
additively separable form of the utility function for the representative taxpayer is
not the problem, nor is the assumption of a representative consumer used to evaluate
social welfare.
3. (Stigma) Increasing stigma cost would reduce tax evasion but, as discussed above,
our assumed level of stigma appears already to be on the high side.
4. (Other factors) How about realistic features of the tax system that we have not
included? For example, forms of taxes other than income taxes, fraudulent claims of
bene￿ts and costs of enforcing tax compliance. But in each of these cases we expect
the paradox to reappear: at a tax rate that would generate the observed government
tax revenue, EUT predicts too much evasion. Because of the Yitzhaki (1974) result,
an increase in the tax rate that would reduce evasion to observed magnitudes would
simultaneously increase tax revenue to well above observed values. Modelling labour
supply has its own problems.45
44Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) calculated that a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of 30 implies that the
certainty equivalent of the prospect win 50;000 or 100;00 each with probability 0:5 is 51;209.
45A large number of studies show a small negative aggregate labour supply elasticity of income (see, for
example, Pencavel (1986) and Killingworth and Heckman (1986)). Clearly this would compound rather
than solve the di¢ culties faced by EUT in explaining tax evasion. Many studies also show a small positive
aggregate labour supply elasticity and some show a large positive elasticity. Many problems of applying
EUT to labour supply are discussed in Bewley (1999).
266. Optimal tax under PT (regimes PT1 to PT4)
We now consider the four regimes, PT1 to PT4 in which the taxpayer uses PT in making
the tax evasion decision. In all of them the tax evasion decision is modelled using prospect
theory.
6.1. Regime PT1
Here the tax evasion decision is modelled using PT, as in section (4) above. In particular,
tax revenues are now given by (4.16). However, the government￿ s objective is still to
maximize (5.1), the utility of a representative consumer-taxpayer with average income
who does not evade. But now the relevant budget constraint is (4.16). It is routine,
though tedious, to show that this optimizing problem has a unique maximum, and that
the resulting optimal tax rate is in the interior of the interval [0;1]. Hence, it can be
found by solving the ￿rst order condition U0 (t) = 0. Some simple algebra show that this
is equivalent to solving ￿(1 ￿ t)
@G(t)
@t = (1 ￿ ￿)G(t). The solution is:
t = ￿, for ! = 1,  ￿ ￿ 1 or   ￿ 0. (6.1)
If ! = 1, then no one can evade. If   ￿ 0 then all those who can evade decide not to.
If  ￿ ￿ 1 then all those who can evade do so. In all these cases the optimal tax rate is
t = ￿.
However, the more empirically relevant case is when ! < 1 and 0 <  ￿ < 1. Here
some taxpayers can evade but choose not to. In this case the ￿rst order condition gives
the quadratic equation in t:
(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)) t
2 ￿ [1 + 2￿(1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)) ]t + ￿ = 0 (6.2)
The optimum is the solution with the negative square root. It is given by:
t =
1 + 2￿(1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ p(1 + ￿))  ￿ Z
2(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)) 
, ! < 1, 0 <  ￿ < 1,
where,
Z =
q
[1 + 2￿(1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)) ]
2 ￿ 4￿(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)) .
6.2. Regime PT2
The utility function (5.1) is additively separable over private and public provision. How-
ever, in actual practice, there are strong complementarities between the two. To take
account of this, the utility function is now given by (2.17), as explained in section 2.4
27under the regime PT2. In this model, we see that public provision has value only insofar
as it facilitates private consumption. As with regime PT1, the government chooses the
tax rate, t, so as to maximize the utility of a representative consumer with average income
who does not evade, but now with the utility function:
U (t) = F
￿
(1 ￿ t)Y ￿
B
G(t)
￿
, F
0 > 0, F
00 < 0, G(t) > 0, 0 <
B
G(t)
< (1 ￿ t)Y , (6.3)
where G(t) is given by the budget constraint (4.16). The condition 0 < B
G(t) < (1 ￿ t)Y ,
together with (4.16), guarantees that any optimum must be an interior point. Hence it
must satisfy the ￿rst order condition U0 (t) = 0. Some simple algebra shows that this is
equivalent to solving B @G
@t = Y G2. Using (4.16), the solution is
t =
( p
B
Y for ! = 1 or   ￿ 0
1
Y
q
B
!+p(1+￿)(1￿!) for  t ￿ 1
(6.4)
If ! = 1, then no one can evade. If   ￿ 0 then all those who can evade decide not to.
In both cases the optimal tax rate is t =
p
B
Y . For the case  t ￿ 1, all those who can
evade, do evade. However, the most empirically relevant case is when 0 <  t < 1. Here
some taxpayers can evade but choose not to. In this case the ￿rst order condition gives
the quartic equation in t:
(1 ￿ !)
2 (1 ￿ p(1 + ￿))
2  
2￿t
4 ￿ 2(1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)) ￿t
3 + ￿t
2
+2(1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)) t ￿ 1 = 0; 0 <  t < 1 and ￿ =
￿
Y
￿2
B
: (6.5)
(6.5) has, of course, four roots. However, in simulations we always found the optimum to
be the only root in the interval (0;1).
6.3. Regime PT3
So far, we have considered a representative consumer. An alternative welfare criterion is
for the government to maximize the sum (or average) utility. For this we need to specify
an income distribution. We choose the gamma distribution because of its tractability and
because it gives quite a good representation of income distribution for middle incomes
(which are the most relevant for determining aggregate tax revenue: the poor do not have
much income and the rich are few in number) see, for example, Cowell (2000, p146). The
Appendix gives all we need to know about the gamma distribution.
As explained in section 2.4 under the regime PT3, we generalize regime PT1 in two
ways. Society￿ s preference over private and public provision is given by the more general
utility function (2.18). Instead of a representative consumer, the government now chooses
28the tax rate, t, so as to maximize the sum (or average) utility, i.e., the social welfare
function, W (t), is now:
W (t) =
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=0
"
￿
[G(t)]
1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
[(1 ￿ t)Y ]
1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
#
dxds, (6.6)
where G(t) is given by (4.16). Thus the government chooses the tax rate, t, so as to
maximize society￿ s total (or average) utility in the state where none evades tax. However,
the government does allow for the e⁄ect on the tax revenue, G(t), of tax evasion as
described by PT. (6.6) simpli￿es to:
W (t) = ￿
(G(t))
1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
+
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ t)
1￿￿
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=0
Y
1￿￿dxds. (6.7)
The combination of the power form (2.18) for utility with the gamma distribution for
income (10.1) leads to very tractable math. In particular, we get
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=0
Y
1￿￿dxds =
1
ba￿(a)
Z 1
Y =0
Y
1￿￿Y
a￿1e
￿ Y
b dY
=
b1￿￿￿(1 + a ￿ ￿)
￿(a)
1
b1+a￿￿￿(1 + a ￿ ￿)
Z 1
Y =0
Y
(1+a￿￿)￿1e
￿ Y
b dY
=
b1￿￿￿(1 + a ￿ ￿)
￿(a)
(6.8)
From (6.7) and (6.8), we get:
W (t) = ￿
[G(t)]
1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
+
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ t)
1￿￿ b1￿￿￿(1 + a ￿ ￿)
￿(a)
. (6.9)
Let
’ =
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ t)
1￿￿ b1￿￿￿(1 + a ￿ ￿)
￿(a)
:
From (4.16) and (6.9), we get:
W (t) =
8
<
:
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 (ab)
1￿￿ t1￿￿ + ’ if   ￿ 0
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 (ab)
1￿￿ [t ￿ (1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)) t2]
1￿￿ + ’ if 0 <  t < 1
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 [! + p(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ !)]
1￿￿ (ab)
1￿￿ t1￿￿ + ’ if  t ￿ 1
(6.10)
Maximizing W (t) in the two cases   ￿ 0 and  t ￿ 1 is simple and leads to the optimal
tax rates:
t =
8
> > > <
> > > :
￿
1 +
￿
1￿￿
￿
￿ 1
￿ ￿
￿(1￿￿+a)
a1￿￿￿(a)
￿ 1
￿
￿￿1
if   ￿ 0
[!+p(1+￿)(1￿!)]
1￿￿
￿
[!+p(1+￿)(1￿!)]
1￿￿
￿ +(
1￿￿
￿ )
1
￿
￿
￿(1￿￿+a)
a1￿￿￿(a)
￿ 1
￿ if  t ￿ 1
(6.11)
29When   ￿ 0; no taxpayer evades. When  t ￿ 1, all those who can evade, do evade.
However, the empirically more relevant case is when 0 <  t < 1, where some who can
evade do but others who can evade choose not to. For this case, the ￿rst order condition,
W 0 (t) = 0 gives the following non-linear equation:
[1 ￿ 2(1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)) t]
1
￿ (1 ￿ t) (6.12)
=
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿ 1
￿ ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿ + a)
a1￿￿￿(a)
￿ 1
￿ ￿
t ￿ (1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ p(1 + ￿)) t
2￿
, if 0 <  t < 1.
Equation (6.12) can be easily solved numerically, given values for the parameters.
It is easy to check that, for ￿ = 1, (6.11) reduces to (6.1) and that (6.12) reduces to
(6.2). Thus, the utilitarian regime, PT3, reduces to the representative consumer regime,
PT1, for ￿ = 1.
6.4. Regime PT4
Finally, we consider a regime where tax evasion is described by PT and, also, the govern-
ment chooses the tax rate, t, so as to maximize the sum (or average) of the PT utilities of
the consumer-taxpayers. Thus, social welfare is now given by:
W (t) =
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=0
V dxds. (6.13)
Substituting from (4.12) into (6.13), we get:
W (t) =
Z 1
x=0
Z 1
s=0
￿w
￿(p)
h
(sc + ￿t)
￿ ￿ (s + ￿t)
￿
i
[Y ￿ D]
￿ dxds. (6.14)
From (4.13) and (6.14), we get
W (t) =
Z 1
x=0
Z sc
s=0
￿w
￿(p)
h
(sc + ￿t)
￿ ￿ (s + ￿t)
￿
i
Y
￿dxds. (6.15)
Invoking our assumption of independence of stigma and income we get, from (6.15),
W (t) =
Z sc
s=0
￿w
￿(p)
h
(sc + ￿t)
￿ ￿ (s + ￿t)
￿
i
ds
Z 1
x=0
Y
￿dx (6.16)
= ￿w
￿(p)
￿
sc (sc + ￿t)
￿ ￿
1
(￿ + 1)
h
(sc + ￿t)
￿+1 ￿ (￿t)
￿+1
i￿Z 1
x=0
Y
￿dx.
From (4.11) and (6.16), we get:
W (t) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
0 if   ￿ 0
￿w￿(p)t￿+1
h
  (  + ￿)
￿ ￿
( +￿)￿+1￿￿￿+1
1+￿
i
1 Z
x=0
Y ￿dx if 0 <  t < 1
￿w￿(p)
h
(￿t)
￿ ￿
(￿t)￿+1￿(￿t)￿+1
1+￿
i
1 Z
x=0
Y ￿dx if  t ￿ 1
(6.17)
30We shall consider only the case 0 <  t < 1, since this is the empirically relevant one.
Here, some taxpayers who can evade do, but others who can evade do not. It can be
checked that the optimal tax depends on the sign of
￿ =
￿
  (  + ￿)
￿ ￿
1
1 + ￿
h
(  + ￿)
￿+1 ￿ ￿
￿+1
i￿
. (6.18)
If ￿ < 0, then welfare is strictly decreasing in t. Hence, the optimal tax rate is zero.
This result is not surprising at all, since public provision does not ￿gure in the utility
functions, thus increasing the tax rate reduces private consumption without any gain. If
￿ > 0, then welfare is strictly increasing in the tax rate. Thus, the optimal tax rate is
t = 1 and the ￿ optimum￿is for the government to con￿scate all the wealth of those who
cannot evade or will not evade. This causes a huge loss in private consumption, but with
no gain, since public provision is not in the utility functions.
The reason for this absurd result is that taxation shifts the reference point down.
Those who cannot, or will not, evade are always at their reference point, so always have
zero utility relative to that. Those who evade, and are not caught, have a huge increase
in utility, measured relative to their reference point. But this huge relative increase in
relative utility has no real welfare signi￿cance. Surprisingly, it is this, the most absurd
of cases, that is picked up by our simulations (see next section). Hence, the message is
that inferring preferences revealed in an inappropriate context can have disastrous policy
e⁄ects.
7. Optimal Taxation: PT and EUT compared
We now compare the relative success of PT and EUT in explaining tax evasion. We
use the same parameter values as before, when taxpayers had expected utility prefer-
ences: p = 0:015, ￿ = 0:5, and ! = 0:4. We take the values ￿ = 0:88 and ￿ = 2:25
from Tversky and Kahneman (1992). We adopt the Prelec probability weighting func-
tion, w+ = w￿ = e￿(￿lnp)￿
, with the value ￿ = 0:225 implied by the data reported by
Bernasconi (1998). The results are tabulated below, where na stands for ￿ not applicable￿ .
Table-III: Optimal taxes, spending and tax gaps in various regimes
31Regime ￿ ￿ B t s1 s2 sc G(t)
tY ￿G(t)
G(t)
EU 0:40 1 na 0:52 0:21 1 na 31:71 0:640
EU 0:65 1 na 0:77 0 1 na 64:10 0:200
PT1 0:44 1 na 0:387 na na 0:282 32:28 0:198
PT2 na na 1539 0:385 na na 0:280 32:14 0:197
PT3 0:45 2 na 0:385 na na 0:281 32:20 0:197
PT3 0:58 0:12 na 0:388 na na 0:282 32:40 0:199
PT4 na na na 1 na na 0:728 57:30 0:745
The ￿rst two rows are reproduced from Table-II, which gave results of calibrating
regime EUT. Consumer-taxpayers are expected utility maximizers and use the same utility
function to decide how much income to declare and also to express their preferences over
private and public provision. The government uses this same utility function to determine
the optimal tax rate. From the ￿rst row, we see that ￿ = 0:4 gives about the correct level
of total government tax revenues, G(t), for the USA. However, the tax gap ratio,
tY ￿G(t)
G(t) ,
is far too high, being about three times the correct value. On the other hand, from the
second row, we see that ￿ = 0:65 gives about the correct tax gap ratio for the USA. But
then total government tax revenue is far too high, being about twice what it should be.
The reason is that at observed audit probabilities and penalty and stigma rates, evasion
is very attractive to an expected utility maximizer. Hence evasion is too high at observed
levels of taxation. However, because of the Yitzhaki e⁄ect, increasing the tax rate reduces
evasion. So, to get observed evasion rates, taxes have to be too high.
Rows 3 to 7 give the results when tax evasion is described by PT.
Row 3 gives the results for regime PT1. For PT1, consumer-taxpayers￿evasion decisions
are described by PT. However, their preferences over private and public consumption are
given by the same utility function as in regime EUT.46 The government chooses the tax rate
so as to maximize the same welfare function as in regime EUT. However, the government
takes into account the e⁄ect on tax revenues as predicted by PT.
Row 3 of the table shows that when consumer preferences over private and public
consumption (￿ = 0:44) give a tax revenue (G(t) = 32:28) close to what is observed (
32), we automatically get a tax gap ratio (
tY ￿G(t)
G(t) = 0:198) close to what is observed (0:2).
This suggests that PT provides the correct model for tax evasion.
The welfare function used in regime PT1 is additively separable over private and public
consumption. By contrast, the welfare function used in regime PT2 exhibits strong com-
plementarity between the two. From row 4, we see that when preferences between private
46Alternatively, and as explained in the introduction, this could simply re￿ ect paternalism on the part
of the government. Our results do not depend on which interpretation is chosen. This comment applies
to regimes PT2 and PT3 as well.
32consumption and public provision (B = 1539) give a tax revenue (G(t) = 32:14) close to
the observed value (32), they also gives a value for the output gap ratio (
tY ￿G(t)
G(t) = 0:197)
close to what is observed (0:2). Thus PT successfully explains tax evasion with two very
di⁄erent welfare functions.
For regime PT3, the criterion is to maximize aggregate (or average) utility, rather than
that of a representative consumer of regimes PT1 and PT2. Also, regime PT3 generalizes
PT1 in that it allows any (constant) coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, ￿, while in PT1
this coe¢ cient was ￿ = 1. In fact, for ￿ = 1, PT3 reduces to PT1. Since ￿ = 1 is at
the low end of the range (between one to two) reported by Bernasconi (1998), in row 5
we choose ￿ = 2 to test the high end. The value ￿ = 0:45 results in approximately the
correct level of tax revenue (G(t) = 32:2) and gives a nearly correct output gap ratio
(0:197). Row 6 reports the results for setting ￿ = 0:12, which is consistent with the value
of ￿ = 0:88, reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).47 The value ￿ = 0:58 gives a
near correct value for tax revenue (32:4) and, again, a near correct value for the output
gap ratio (0:199).
Using PT to model the tax evasion decision works for the following reasons. By taking
the reference point to be the legal after-tax income, the taxpayer is in the domain of gains if
not caught but in the domain of losses if caught.48 This allows loss aversion, overweighting
of the small probability of detection and underweighting the high probability of non-
detection to considerably increase the deterrence e⁄ect of punishment, despite low values
of p and ￿ (and the mild convexity of the value function for losses). This facilitates the
derivation of the correct government budget constraint. By contrast, under EUT we get
the wrong government budget constraint.
A fundamental principle of liberalism is that people are the best judges of their own
welfare. However, the regimes PT1-PT3 use one set of preferences (PT) to model the tax
evasion decision but another (standard utility theory) to describe preferences over private
and public consumption. Furthermore, these regimes are successful in accounting for the
observed facts on the tax gap and government expenditure.
This conclusion is further reinforced by the results of regime PT4. Regime PT4 uses
PT to explain tax evasion (as in PT1-PT3), but also uses PT as a welfare criterion.
Row 7 shows that PT4 gives wildly wrong values for all the variables. Worse, it gives the
economically absurd result that when neither consumers nor government care about public
provision, then the optimal tax rate is 100%. This absurd result comes about because PT4
47The low value, ￿ = 0:12, should not be interpreted to mean that consumers are nearly risk neutral.
For attitude to risk in PT depends, not only on the curvature of the value function, but also on the
coe¢ cient of loss aversion and the probability weighting function.
48Proposition 3 of Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) establishes that a consumer is in the domain of gains
if caught but in the domain of losses if not caught if, and only if, the reference point is legal after tax
income.
33works by pushing down the reference point, so giving very high relative utility. But that
does not correspond to any sensible measure of welfare. Thus, although PT gives the
correct budget constraint in PT4, it also gives a completely wrong welfare criterion. The
message is clear: inferring preferences from the wrong context can have disastrous policy
e⁄ects.
8. Summary
A fundamental assumption of neoclassical economics is that decision makers have a com-
plete transitive ordering over all possible outcomes. Research over the last 60 years has
shown that this is not valid, not even as a rough approximation. With a simple general
equilibrium model of optimal taxation in the presence of tax evasion, we were able to
account well for the observed magnitudes. The key was recognizing that preferences are
context dependent. In our successful regimes, we assumed that consumer-taxpayers be-
have according to prospect theory when they are considering how much income to declare.
But that government, when maximizing social welfare on their behalf, use standard utility
theory. However, when either expected utility on its own or prospect theory on its own is
used to model both tax evasion and social welfare then the calibrated results are not in
conformity with the data.
At observed audit probabilities and penalty and stigma rates, tax evasion is very at-
tractive to an expected utility maximizer. Hence expected utility theory (EUT) predicts
levels of evasion that are too high at observed levels of taxation. However, because of the
Yitzhaki e⁄ect, increasing the tax rate reduces evasion. So, to get observed evasion rates,
taxes have to be too high.
Under prospect theory (PT), taking the reference point to be the legal after-tax income
ensures that the taxpayer is always in the domain of losses if caught and always in the
domain of gains if not caught. Loss aversion, overweighting of low probabilities and the
concavity of the value function for losses then ensure that punishment hurts more under
PT than under EUT. Because of underweighting of high probabilities, the prospect of not
being caught is less attractive under PT than under EUT. Hence, the deterrence e⁄ect of
punishment is much stronger under PT. Thus, using PT to model tax evasion produces
the observed levels of tax evasion.
Because of bounded rationality, consumer-taxpayers have to simplify considerably, con-
centrating on the salient features of the problem at hand. Hence, we cannot take their
tax evasion behavior as revealing their preferences over private versus public consumption.
Thus while PT gives the correct government budget constraint, it gives a completely wrong
welfare criterion.
A fundamental principle of liberalism is that people are the best judges of their own
34welfare. Neoclassical economics recognizes that applying this principle is problematic;
governments have to take account of imperfections such as externalities, market failures
and monopoly power. However, PT highlights additional issues. But, this is not necessarily
a reason to restrict liberalism. On the contrary, by providing a descriptively more correct
theory, PT can potentially enhance the applicability of liberal principles.
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10. Appendix: The Gamma Distribution
Most of the de￿nitions, below, can also be found in Cowell (2000). The gamma distribution
is given by
G(Y ;a;b) =
1
ba￿(a)
Z Y
y=0
y
a￿1e
￿
y
bdy, a ￿ 1, b > 0, (10.1)
where ￿(a) is the gamma function, given by:
￿(a) =
Z 1
x=0
x
a￿1e
￿xdx, a ￿ 1. (10.2)
If n is a positive integer, then
￿(n) = (n ￿ 1)! (10.3)
The mean and variance of the gamma distribution (10.1) are given by:
Y = ab, varY = ab
2. (10.4)
The Gini index for the gamma distribution is given by:
Gini(a;b) =
1
Y
Z 1
Y =0
(2G(Y ;a;b) ￿ 1)Y dG(Y ;a;b)
=
2b
Y (￿(a))
2
Z 1
Y =0
Y
ae
￿Y
￿Z Y
X=0
X
a￿1e
￿XdX
￿
dY ￿ 1. (10.5)
The simplest gamma distribution that has the correct shape is:
G(Y ;2;1) =
Z Y
y=0
ye
￿ydy, (10.6)
35for which
Gini(2;1) = 0:375,
mean = 2, median = 1:6783,
median
mean
=
1:6783
2
= 0:83915. (10.7)
Ryu and Slottje (2001, p303) report that estimates of Gini coe¢ cients typically lie in the
range 0:34 ￿ 0:43, so Gini(2;1) = 0:375 is not unreasonable.
For G(Y ;2;1), the quantal functional, Q(p), the cumulative income functional, C (p),
and the Lorenz curve, L(p), are given by, respectively,
p 2 [0;1], Y 2 [0;1), p = G(Y ;2;1) ) Q(p) = Y ,
C (p) =
Z Q(p)
y=0
y
2e
￿ydy = 2 ￿ 2e
￿Q(p) ￿ 2Q(p)e
￿Q(p) ￿ (Q(p))
2 e
￿Q(p), p 2 [0;1],
L(p) =
C (p)
Y
, p 2 [0;1]. (10.8)
Q(p) can be found by solving the equations (1 ￿ p)ex2 = 1 + x2, Q(p) = x2, where the
square has been chosen to force the computer to the positive solution.
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